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JURISDICTION 
This case involves review of a final decision of the 
Utah State Tax Commission. The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with the State Tax Commission pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(ii) (1992). The Supreme Court 
transferred this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 1992 
Utah Laws 127, § 11 (to be codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4)). The Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction of this case 
pursuant to 1992 Utah Laws 127, § 12 (to be codified at Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k)). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for agency decisions on proceedings 
initiated prior to January 1, 1988, is determined by case law 
prior to the adoption of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 583-4 (Utah 
1992). This prior case law applied three basic standards of 
review set forth in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). These three 
standards are to be applied depending on whether the agency 
decision is based on a question of fact or law. 
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First, agency decisions of basic fact are to be given great 
weight and only overturned if they are not supported by any 
evidence of substance whatsoever. Administrative Services, 658 
P.2d at 609- Second, agency decisions of general law are to be 
reviewed giving no deference to the agency's decision, but 
reviewing it for correctness. J[d. at 608. Finally, agency 
decisions involving mixed questions of law and fact or the 
application of specific factual situations to the legislative 
enactments under which the agency operates are to be reviewed 
giving some deference to the agency's decision and upheld so long 
as they fall within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
Id. at 610. 
I. The first issue in this case is whether the sale of 
Superior's water softeners after installation and use of that 
water softener pursuant to a lease agreement is subject to Utah 
sales tax. 
Standard of Review. This is a mixed question of law and 
fact and should be reviewed giving some deference to the Tax 
Commission's decision because it involves application of the Tax 
Commission's expertise in the interpretation of the statutes 
which it is empowered to administer. 
II. The second issue is whether the Tax Commission violated 
the Administrative Rulemaking Act in assessing sales tax on the 
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sale of water softeners sold after a lease arrangement. 
Standard of Review. This is a question of statutory 
interpretation and should be reviewed giving no particular 
deference to the Tax Commission's decision. 
III. The third issue is whether Superior should be relieved 
from paying the sales tax assessed because Superior 
misinterpreted the tax laws. 
Standard of Review. This question should be reviewed giving 
some deference to the Tax Commission's decision because it 
involves application of the Tax Commission's expertise in the 
interpretation of the statutes which the Tax Commission is 
empowered to administer. 
IV. The fourth issue is whether Superior's due process 
claim is barred from review because Superior failed to raise the 
issue before the Tax Commission. Additionally, if Superior's due 
process argument is barred then Superior's claim for attorney 
fees under 4 2 U.S.C.A. 1988 should also be denied. If the Court 
allows this Issue to be entertained, then the issue is whether 
Superior's due process rights have been violated. 
Standard of Review. This is a question of constitutional 
interpretation and should be reviewed giving no deference to the 
Tax Commission's decision. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All determinative statutes, rules and constitutional 
provisions include the following and are set forth verbatim in 
Appendix A attached hereto: 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4 (Supp. 1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3 (Supp. 1986) 
Utah Admin. Rule 865-19-51S (1986) 
Utah Admin. Rule R865-19-58S (1986) 
Utah Admin. Rule R865-19-78S (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-l to -15 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3 to -4 (1987) 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, section 7 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1979) 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case results from a sales and use tax audit for the 
audit period 1/1/85-12/30/86, conducted by the Auditing Division 
of the Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter "Tax Commission" or 
"Respondent"), of Superior Softwater (hereinafter "Superior" or 
"Petitioner"). The Auditing Division assessed Superior for, 
among other items, sales tax it should have collected on the 
selling price of water softeners that it first leased on a 
monthly basis to a customer and then sold to that same customer. 
That final selling price has been referred to as the residual 
sales price because it is the price of the water softener minus 
the monthly lease payments. R. 95. It is the tax treatment of 
this type of sale that has remained as the only issue throughout 
the lengthy history of this case that is relevant to the present 
appeal. The course of the proceedings is lengthy and is set out 
specifically in the Statement of Facts below. The Tax Commission 
held in its final decision on this matter that sales tax must be 
collected on the residual sales price of a water softner that h^o 
been first leased and then sold. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner is in the business of manufacturing, 
renting, and selling water softeners. Petitioner has operated 
Superior Soft Water in its present venture since February 1985. 
R. 19. 
2. This case results from a sales and use tax audit of 
Petitioner conducted by the Auditing Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission. The audit period at issue is January 1, 1985 
through December 31, 1986. The amount at issue is $11,855.97 
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plus interest accruing daily at $3.59. R. 19-20. 
3. Superior was in business from 1956-1971 and started up 
again in 1985. T. 19-20. Mr. Gerald Lambourne of Superior 
testified that Superior was audited by the Auditing Division in 
1959 or 1960 and at that point claims it was collecting and 
remitting sales tax on all its transactions, including those 
leases that were later converted to sales. T. 48. He claimed 
that no sales tax deficiency was assessed. R. 6. 
4. Superior claims it was later told by a competitor that 
water softeners were to be considered real property and should 
not be taxed and so Superior requested a meeting with the Tax 
Commission where it was told not to collect sales tax on water 
softeners that it sold because they were considered to be real 
property. T. 53-54; R. 6. However, although Superior met with 
the Tax Commission, the appropriate method of determining sales 
tax on leases which were converted to sales was not discussed. 
R. 6. 
5. As a result of the tax assessment resulting from the 
audit conducted for the period 1/1/85-12/31/86, Petitioner filed 
a Petition for Redetermination and an informal hearing was held 
on January 6, 1988, David Angerhofer, Hearing Officer, presiding. 
R.117. 
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6. The Tax Commission issued its Informal Decision on May 
5, 1988 upholding the tax assessment. R.119. The findings of 
the informal decision stated in pertinent part: 
Water softeners which are first leased to a customer 
and then sold to that customer are subject to tax on 
the monthly rental payment for the duration of the 
lease, and are subject to sales and use tax on the 
residual sales price of the later sale of the water 
softener to that customer. Separate transactions will 
have occurred. There is no double taxation. 
R. 118. 
7. A request for clarification of the Tax Commission's 
Informal Decision regarding the tax liability of Superior's water 
softeners was submitted on September L6, 1988 by Brian C. 
McGavin, C.P.A., on behalf of Superior Soft Water. R. 113. This 
was answered in writing by James E. Harward, Tax Commission 
Hearing Officer, on January 18, 1989. R.112. 
8. A request for clarification of James E. Harward's 
clarification was filed by Gerald Lambourne on behalf of Superior-
Soft Water some time after January 18, 1989. This was again 
answered in writing by James Harward, Hearing Officer, on April 
26, 1989. R. 111. 
9 <• Because Superior continued to claim that the Tax 
Commission's position was confusing, the Auditing Division filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Informal 
Decision dated May 5, 1988, on September 22, 1989. R. 94-110. 
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(See the Auditing Division's Motion at R. 94-110 for a more 
thorough discussion of the conflict of interpretation.) 
10. The Tax Commission held a clarification hearing on 
February 6, 1991. R. 48. Briefs by both the Auditing Division 
and Superior were submitted and are a part of this record. R. 
55-71; R. 72-85. 
11. The Tax Commission issued its Order from the 
clarification hearing on February 27, 1991, which held the 
purchases of water softener by customers either during or upon 
the completion of a lease as being sales by Superior. R. 48-54. 
12. Petitioner filed its Petition for Formal Hearing on 
March 29, 1991. The sole issue was the tax consequence to a 
water softener that was first leased and then sold. R. 44. 
13. The Tax Commission held a Formal Hearing on October 29, 
1991. R. 4. Testimony was taken and the transcript of this 
hearing is part of the record. Briefs were submitted also and 
are part of the record at R. 11-18; R. 23-34. 
14. The Tax Commission issued its Final Decision on 
February 6f 1992 (erroneously dated February 6, 1991 on the 
Decision). In its Conclusions of Law, the Commission stated: 
Tangible personal property which is attached to 
real property, but remains personal property, is 
subject to sales tax on the retail selling price of the 
personal property, and installation charges are exempt 
if separately stated. (Utah Admin. Rule R865-19-
51S(E)) 
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R. 7. This Final Decision affirmed both the previous Informal 
Decision and the subsequent Order- R. 8-9. The Decision and 
Order of the Final Decision states in pertinent part: 
Based upon the facts as presented at all stages of 
these proceedings, the Tax Commission finds that the 
leases of water softeners which were converted to sales 
are subject to sales and use tax on the residual sales 
price of the later sale of the water softener. For 
example, if the sale is for $950.00 less three lease 
payments of $12.95 each, or a total of $38.85, then 
sales tax must be collected on the residual purchase 
price of $911.15. This, of course, assumes that sales 
tax would have already been collected on the $38.85 of 
lease payments. The Commission thus affirms the 
Informal Decision of May 5, 1988 and the Order of 
February 27, 1991. 
The Commission is not persuaded by any argument of 
the Petitioner that it had relied upon past 
representations made by former Tax Commissioners or 
Commission employees, when it claimed it met with those 
individuals in approximately 1962 to ascertain the 
appropriate tax treatment which should be given to 
these types of transactions. As testified to by 
Petitioner's witness, the taxable treatment which 
should be accorded to leases which are subsequently 
converted to sales was not discussed with any of those 
individuals. Therefore, the Petitioner could not have 
relied upon such advice to his detriment. 
R.8-9. 
15. Petitioner filed its Petition for Writ of Review of the 
Tax Commission's Final Decision on March 9, 1992, in the vSupreme 
Court of Utah. R.l. 
16. Petitioner filed its Docketing Statement on March 30, 
1992, in the Supreme Court of Utah. 
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17. The Supreme Court of Utah assigned this case to the 
Utah Court of Appeals and notified the parties by letter dated 
June 1, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner should have collected sales tax on the residual 
price of water softeners sold after they have been installed and 
used pursuant to a lease agreement. The sale of a water softener 
after such a lease arrangement is the sale of tangible personal 
property which is attached to real property and is subject to 
sales tax pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987) and 
Utah Admin. Rule 865-19-51S (1986). The sale price is not exempt 
from tax as installation charges because Petitioner has not 
proved that the sale price represents solely such installation 
charges, and because Petitioner failed to separately state such 
charges pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule 865-19-51S(E) (1986). 
Respondent has not violated the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act (hereinafter "UARA") because Respondent relied on 
established statutes and rules in assessing Petitioner's sale of 
water softeners. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3 (1986), 
rulemaking is not required when a procedure or standard is 
already described in statute. Since the sales tax standard is 
already described by statute# Petitioner is on notice of the tax 
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requirements, and no rule is required. Furthermore, Respondent 
has not "changed" its policy on the taxing of water softeners, 
but has merely applied the relevant taxing statutes to the 
situation at hand. 
Petitioner should not be relieved of its tax liability for 
its own misinterpretation of the law. Mistake of law is no 
defense for failure to pay taxes. 
Petitioner's due process claim is not properly before this 
Court since Petitioner failed to raise such an issue before the 
Tax Commission. Issues not raised by the parties at the fact 
fii^ding level cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Petitioner is therefore barred from raising such a claim. If 
this Court finds that Petitioner may raise such a due process 
claim, the Court should find the Tax Commission has not violated 
Petitioner's due process rights because the taxing statutes are 
sufficiently clear as to what conduct is required. 
Finally, Petitioner should be denied an award of attorney 
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 in this case because 
Petitioner failed to raise a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 
before the Tax Commission, and is therefore barred from raising 
such a claim for the first time on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I- THE SALE OF SUPERIOR'S WATER SOFTENERS AFTER 
INSTALLATION AND USE OF THOSE WATER SOFTENERS PURSUANT 
TO A LEASE AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO UTAH SALES TAX. 
The Tax Commission and Superior agree on the sales tax 
applicable to an outright sale of a water softener pursuant to an 
installation contract. When Petitioner sells a water softener 
and installs it pursuant to a sales contract, the sale is not 
subject to sales tax because it is considered a sale of real 
property not tangible personal property. Instead of requiring 
the purchaser to pay sales tax on the purchase, the 
manufacturer/seller is required to pay tax on the materials used 
to make the water softener. This taxing scheme is explained by 
Utah Admin. Rule R865-19-58S (1986) which provides: "The person 
who converts the personal property into real property is the 
consumer of the personal property since he is the last one to own 
it as personal property." Additionally, in this outright sale 
scenario, the charges for labor to install the-water softeners 
are not subject to sales tax so long as they are separately 
stated. Utah Admin. Rule R865-19-78S (1986). 
Respondent and Petitioner also agree on the tax applicable 
to the leasing of a water softener. When Petitioner leases a 
water softener, the lease payments are subject to use tax 
12 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 59-12-103(1)(k) (1987).l 
The Tax Commission and Superior disagree on the sales tax 
applicable to the sale of a water softener after that water 
softener has been installed and used pursuant to a lease 
contract. It is the Tax Commission's position that the sale of a 
water softener after it has been leased to the customer is 
subject to sales tax pursuant to R865-19-51S on the residual 
price of the water softener. Rule R865-19-51S(E) provides that 
tangible personal property which is attached to real property, 
but remains tangible personal property, is subject to sales tax 
on the retail selling price of the tangible personal property. 
When Superior installs the water softener pursuant to a lease 
contract, the water softener remains tangible personal property 
subject to use tax. Any sale of the water softener after a lease 
arrangement is thus a sale of "tangible personal property which 
is attached to real property, but remains tangible personal 
property," and is a sale subject to sales tax. Thus, if a water 
1
 Citation to the 1987 version of § 59-12-103 is made 
throughout this Brief because this is the statute that has been 
referred to in previous proceedings and in Petitioner's Brief. 
However, the law in effect at the time of the assessment period 
is controlling, and therefore, the correct cite should refer to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-15-4(1)(a) and 59-16-3(1)(c) (Supp. 1986). 
The 1986 and 1987 versions of the stcitute are substantively the 
same, so for simplicity we have continued to cite the statute 
previously used. The 1986 version is set forth verbatim in 
Appendix A attached hereto. 
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softener is installed in a home and then leased for six months 
and thereafter the customer decides to buy it outright, the 
residual price of the water softener--that is the total sale 
price minus the lease payments—is subject to sales tax just as 
the former lease payments were. 
Superior's contention that the sale of the water softener 
after a lease arrangement is not subject to sales tax because the 
residual sale price solely represents installation charges which 
are exempt from tax should be rejected for two reasons. 
First, Superior has offered no evidence that the residual 
cost between a water softener that is first leased.and then sold 
is solely the cost of labor to install the water softener which 
is already installed as a rental item. In fact, Mr. Lambourne 
testified at the Formal Hearing on October 29, 1991, that the 
direct labor cost to install a water softener was between $110.00 
and $125.00, depending on the home's plumbing. T. 40. In 
Petitioner's Brief to the Tax Commission dated January 31, 1991, 
it was noted that the sale price of a water softener is around 
$950.00, and the vendor's cost of materials amounts to $170.00. 
R. 80. Thus, it costs Petitioner $170.00 in materials and 
$110.00 to $125.00 in labor to install the water softener. This 
leaves some $655.00 to $670.00 in unaccounted, mark-up cost. 
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Second, even if Petitioner could prove to the satisfaction 
of this Court that the difference in cost between a rented water 
softener that remains a rental and one that is later sold is the 
cost of the installation charges, Petitioner must still pay tax 
on those charges in this instance because it has not complied 
with R865-19-51S, which states in pertinent part: 
E. Tangible personal property which is attached 
to real property, but remains personal property, is 
subject to sales tax on the retail selling price of the 
personal property, and installation charges are exempt 
if separately stated. If the retailer does not 
segregate the selling price and installation charges, 
the sales tax applies to the entire sales price, 
including installation charges. 
Utah Admin. Rule R865-19-51S(E) (1986) (emphasis added). Since 
Superior did not segregate out the installation charges for its 
water softeners from the entire sales price of the water 
softeners when it sells them after a leasing period, the sales 
tax applies to the entire sales price*, including installation 
charges. A taxpayer may not later claim, as Superior attempts to 
do here, that the entire product price outside of material is 
tax-exempt installation costs unless these installation charges 
were separately stated. To allow this would be to grant an 
unauthorized tax exemption on a portion of the sales price of the 
product. 
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II, THE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT IN ASSESSING SALES TAX ON 
THE SALE OF WATER SOFTENERS SOLD AFTER A LEASE 
ARRANGEMENT. 
The Tax Commission has relied on established statutes and 
rules in assessing sales tax on Superior's sales of water 
softeners sold after use of the softeners by purchasers pursuant 
to a lease agreement. The Tax Commission has not adopted a new 
rule for such tax treatment nor has it made a change in policy 
for such tax treatment, and therefore, it has not violated the 
rulemaking requirements of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
(hereinafter "UARA"). Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-l to -15 (1986). 
A. The Tax Commission has not violated the UARA 
because no rulemaking is necessary in this case. 
Under the 1986 version of the UARA, subsection 3 provides: 
(3) Rulemaking is required when: 
(a) agency actions affect a class of persons; 
(b) agency actions affect the operations of another 
agency; or 
(c) statutory or federal mandate requires rules. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3 (1986).2 Under this version of the 
2
 Petitioner cites the 1987 version of the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act in its Brief submitted to this 
Court. However, the law in effect at the time of the assessment 
period is controlling, and therefore, the 1986 version of the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act is controlling. A comparison 
of the two versions reveals that the 1986 version is more lenient 
and favors Respondent's position that no rulemaking is required 
in this case. Both versions of this Act are attached hereto in 
Appendix A. 
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Rulemaking Act, Respondent is not required to follow rulemaking 
procedures because Respondent's assessment does not affect a 
class of persons or the operations of another agency, nor is 
Respondent required by statute or federal mandate to make a rule 
in this case. 
Additionally, the UARA provides at subsection 4: 
(4) Rulemaking is not required when: 
(a) a procedure or standard is already described 
in statute; 
(b) agency action affects an individual person, 
not a class of persons; . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4 (1986). 
Pursuant to this statute, no rulemaking is required in this 
case because the taxing of the transaction at issue is already 
described by statute. The law the Tax Commission relies on here 
is Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103. Section 59-12-103 provides: 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal 
property if the property situs is in this state, 
if the lessee took possession in this state, or if 
the property is stored, used, or otherwise 
consumed in this state; . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) (1987). 
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In this case there are two separate transactions and each is 
governed by the above statute. The first transaction involves 
the lease of tangible personal property when Petitioner leases a 
water softener to a customer. It is undisputed that this 
transaction is subject to use tax pursuant to § 59-12-103(1)(k). 
The second transaction involves the sale of tangible personal 
property when Petitioner sells the water softener to the customer 
who had been leasing the water softener. This transaction is 
subject to sales tax pursuant to § 59-12-103(1)(a). Since the 
water softener is installed pursuant to the lease agreement, it 
remains tangible personal property at the time of the sale. It 
is undisputed that § 59-12-103 is applicable in this case, and 
Respondent's interpretation of this statute is straightforward 
and does not involve the adoption of a new rule. 
Furthermore, no rulemaking is required in this case because 
Petitioner has not shown that the ruling of the Tax Commission 
has affected anyone other than itself. No evidence has been 
presented to show that other water softener companies similarly 
rent and then sell a water softener and might therefore be 
affected. Thus, under § 63-46a-4(b), no rulemaking is required 
because the "agency action affects an individual person, not a 
class of persons." 
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B. The Tax Commission has not violated the notice 
requirement of the UARA because the standard is 
already set forth by a statute that gives notice. 
Petitioner argues that a rule should have been adopted 
setting forth the proposition that water softeners first rented 
and then sold are subject to sales tax on the residual price so 
that Petitioner would be on notice of the tax requirement. 
However, since the sales tax standard is already provided by 
statute, Petitioner is imputed with knowledge and notice of the 
tax requirements. The Tax Commission does not provide a rule for 
every different situation in which the application of the taxing 
statutes arises, nor can it be expected'to do so. Such a 
requirement would dictate a rule for almost every taxpayer and 
would, therefore, be unwieldy and impossibly burdensome, 
C. The Tax Commission has not violated the UARA 
because there was nev€>r a change in policy by the 
Tax Commission, 
Superior further contends that the Tax Commission has 
improperly "changed" its policy on taxing water softeners. 
Respondent has not changed its policy on the taxing of water 
softeners, but has merely applied the relevant taxing statutes to 
the situation at hand. When the taxing of water softeners was 
previously discussed between Petitioner and the Tax Commission, 
the subject matter of that conversation was limited to the sales 
tax on outright sales of water softeners pursuant to installation 
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contracts, T. 28, 44- The taxation at issue today is the sales 
tax on sales of water softeners after a leasing arrangement and 
Superior has offered no evidence that it ever, whether during its 
first business venture during 1956-1971 or again in 1985, 
inquired about the tax consequence to the residual price of a 
water softener after it had been leased first. R. 6; T. 44. 
Applying a different statute or rule to a different transaction 
is not a "change" in policy* Respondent's position has remained 
the same: outright sales of water softeners pursuant to 
installation contracts are not subject to sales tax; sales of 
water softeners after installation and use of the water softeners 
pursuant to a lease agreement are subject to sales tax. 
While Respondent should not play "hide-the-ball" with its 
tax interpretation policies, it cannot read the mind of every 
taxpayer posing questions to the Commission and explain to the 
taxpayer every tax aspect of the taxpayer's business. Once again 
this would be too cumbersome a duty to place on the Tax 
Commission. It is up to the taxpayer to find out how each 
different transaction in his business is taxed and Superior has 
testified in this case that it did not do so. T. 44. 
Petitioner cites Williams v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah,, 
720 P-2d 773 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that the Tax 
Commission has violated the rulemaking act because of its 
20 
"change" in policy regarding the taxing of water softeners. 
Williams, however, can be distinguished and can be used to 
support Respondent's position that there has been no "change" in 
policy in this case. 
In Williams, the Utah Supreme Court held that the Public 
Service Commission (hereinafter "PSC") engaged in improper 
rulemaking when it ruled, through adjudication, that it would 
deregulate the one-way telephone paging market. Williams, 720 
P. 2d at 777. The PSC had regulated this market for over twenty 
years and the adjudication thereby changed a long standing 
practice which affected a number of companies to which it had 
previously issued regulatory certificates. The Court found that 
this "change in clear law" required formal rulemaking procedures. 
Id. at 776. 
In the present case, there is no evidence of any "change in 
clear law." As noted above, Petitioner argues that Respondent 
has "changed" its policy over the years in regards to water 
softeners that are first rented and then sold. However, 
Petitioner has admitted at the hearing that although its 
representative talked with Tax Commission representatives 
regarding its tax liability when it resumed business in 1985, it 
never actually asked about the specific tax treatment of water 
softeners that are first leased and then sold. Had Petitioner 
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asked the proper question it could have been made aware of 
Respondent's interpretation of this situation and the Tax 
Commission's position on this matter. Since it never asked a 
question regarding leased water softeners that are thereafter 
sold, and was therefore never given information on that specific 
transaction, Petitioner has not shown that a clear change in law, 
as discussed in the Williams case, has taken place. 
III. RELIEF FROM A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE TAX COMMISSION'S 
INFORMAL AGENCY DECISION SHOULD NOT PROVIDE RELIEF FROM 
A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE LAW. 
The Tax Commission issued an informal.decision on this 
matter on May 5, 1988, affirming the assessment for taxes for the 
audit period in question. That decision noted: 
Water softeners which are first leased to a customer and 
then sold to that customer are subject to tax on the monthly 
rental payments for the duration of the lease, and are 
subject to sales and use tax on the residual sales price of 
the later sale of the water softener to that customer. 
Separate transactions will have occurred. There is no 
double taxation. 
Water softeners which are first leased and then sold to a 
customer become part of the realty at the time of sale. 
R. 118-119. On February 27, 1991, Respondent issued an Order 
clarifying this initial Informal Decision and stating that it was 
meant to uphold completely the assessment of the Auditing 
Division which was that sales tax should be collected on the 
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residual price of the softener at the time of the later sale. 
Respondent noted that Petitioner may have in good faith 
misinterpreted the Informal Decision dated May 5, 1988, and 
therefore relieved Petitioner from paying the taxes it had not 
collected between May 5, 1988 and March 1, 1991 as a result of 
its misinterpretation of that decision. R. 48-54. 
Petitioner now contends that it misinterpreted in good faith 
the taxing statutes so Petitioner should also be relieved from 
paying the taxes it did not collect between January 1, 1985 
through December 31, 1986 as a result of its misinterpretation of 
the law. However, ignorance and mistake of law is no defense for 
failure to pay taxes, nor is misinterpretation, even if made in 
good faith. Rosseberq v. Holesapple, 260 P. 2d 563 (Utah 1953) 
(In a usurious loan case, the court noted, "[i]gnorance of the 
law excuses no one, not even an honest money lender."). 
In Walker Center Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 437 P.2d 888, 
(Utah 1968), the Petitioner urged the reviewing court to apply 
the principle of equitable estoppel to avoid the Tax Commission's 
assessment of a tax claiming the tax amounted to a manifest 
injustice. This argument is similar to Petitioner's argument in 
the case at hand wherein it argues it should not have to pay the 
tax assessed because to do so would be unfair since Petitioner 
used good faith. The Court in Walker refused to apply the 
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equitable estoppel doctrine and noted: 
It appears that the dilemma which the plaintiff finds itself 
in arose for the most part from its lack of diligence in 
pursuing the dissolution procedures which are in fact 
controlled by statute. . . . The record does not indicate 
that the Commission misled the plaintiff in any manner nor 
does the record show that the plaintiff requested 
information which was withheld by the Commission. 
Walker, 437 P.2d at 891- Similarly, Petitioner in the case at 
hand failed to ask all the questions in determining its tax 
responsibilities. The record does not indicate that the 
Commission misled the Petitioner in any manner since the tax 
issue in question was never discussed between the parties. 
Therefore, Petitioner is liable for the tax assessed. 
Petitioner's position is also similar to that of the 
plaintiff in Matter of Estate of Rawlins v. Gardner, 588 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1978). Rawlins involved an argument over the proper 
inheritance taxes to be assessed. The court noted: 
Plaintiff has made the fairly common mistake of taking one 
provision of law in isolation and assuming that it states 
all of the law on the subject, whereas the correct procedure 
is to consider all of the statutes bearing on the problem 
and, unless there is irreconcilable conflict, give them all 
effect if possible. 
Rawlins, 588 P.2d at 179. Similarly, Petitioner in the case at 
hand made the mistake of assuming that two different sale 
transactions of water softeners would be taxed in the same way. 
A mistake in applying the tax laws does not relieve Petitioner of 
its tax liability• 
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IV- SUPERIOR IS BARRED FROM RAISING A DUE PROCESS CLAIM 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND SUPERIOR IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BASED ON SUCH A CLAIM FOR THE 
SAME REASON. 
Petitioner claims for the first time on appeal that its due 
process rights have been violated by Respondent's tax assessment. 
Petitioner fciiled to raise this constitutional claim before the 
Tax Commission and is now barred from raising it for the first 
time on appeal.3 In Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 
1983), the Supreme Court of Utah noted: "It is axiomatic that 
defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the trial court 
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. Bangerter^ 
663 P.2d at L02 (citations omitted). In BJ-Titan Services v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1992), the 
petitioner tried to argue that a transfer of assets was not a 
"sale" because the purchaser owned the same assets before and 
after the transfer, and thus, there was no consideration for a 
sale to have taken place. BJ-Titan, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. 
The Court noted that "[b]ecause this argument was not presented 
to the Commission below, a finding of fact on consideration has 
not been made, and we will not indulge in such evidentiary 
3
 Petitioner states on page 12 of its Brief to the Court of 
Appeals that it has raised a due process claim on page 29 of the 
Record of this case and on pages 77 cind 83 of the Transcript of 
Proceedings on October 29, 1991. However, a reading of these 
cited pages reveals that due process was not raised, nor was it 
raised at any other point in the proceedings of this case. 
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endeavors." BJ-Titan, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 27, n.7 (Utah 
1992). Similarly, Petitioner did not raise its constitutional 
argument before the Tax Commission and therefore the issue is not 
properly before this Court on appeal. To hear Petitioner's due 
process argument now would require an examination of the terms 
and circumstances of the transaction at issue which involves an 
evidentiary endeavor the Court cannot undertake. 
Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to an award of 
attorney fees in this case under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981) (hereinafter 
"section 1988"), because Petitioner failed to raise a claim under 
42 U-S.C.A. § 1983 (1979) (hereinafter "section 1983") in the 
previous proceedings before the Tax Commission. Section 1988 
permits an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a 
proceeding brought under section 1983. Petitioner failed to 
raise a claim under section 1983 at the lower court level and is 
therefore barred from raising such a claim for the first time on 
appeal. Since Petitioner cannot raise a section 1983 claim, 
Petitioner cannot make a claim for attorney fees pursuant to 
section 1988, and must be denied attorney fees in this case. 
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A. If this Court finds Superior's due process claim 
properly before the Court, the Tax Commission argues 
that Superior's due process rights have not been 
violated because the Tax Commission followed 
established guidelines set iorth by statute. 
Respondent has not deprived Petitioner of property without 
due process. Petitioner claims that enforcement of the tax 
statutes in this case fails to give taxpayers sufficient notice 
of tax liability and therefore violates Petitioner's due process 
rights provided in the Utah Constitutionf Article 1, Section 7 
and the Unitexi States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, On the 
contrary, Respondent has merely assessed Petitioner's business 
according to established taxing statutes. Since the taxing 
scheme is set forth by statute, Petitioner is sufficiently 
notified of its tax liability. 
In Walker Center Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 437 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1968), the Plaintiff corporation sought review of a Tax 
Commission decision claiming the decxsion violated the due 
process clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions. 
Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the Tax Commission 
failed to announce, by regulation or otherwise, the Commission's 
policy and practice in granting tax clearances upon the filing of 
an undertaking, thus permitting year-end dissolution proceedings 
and avoidance of an additional year's corporate franchise tax. 
Walker, 437 P.2d at 890. Since Plaintiff was not notified that a 
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speedy tax clearance could have been obtained by the furnishing 
of an undertaking, it failed to obtain such an undertaking and 
was held subject to another year's corporate franchise tax. Id. 
at 890. The Court held that Plaintiff's due process rights were 
not violated by failure of the Tax Commission to notify Plaintiff 
of the Commission's tax clearance policy and practice. Icl. at 
890. The court noted that the record did not indicate that 
Plaintiff made any inquiry of the Commission as to such 
procedures. Nor did the record indicate that Plaintiff ever made 
a request for a tax clearance or that its request was denied by 
the Commission, jfd. at 890. In conclusion, the court held that 
the burden of securing information about corporate dissolution 
and taxing procedures is up to the Plaintiff and failure of the 
Commission to notify a taxpayer of such procedures does not 
violate the taxpayer's due process rights. Walker, 437 P. 2d at 
890. 
Similarly, in Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax 
Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990), Plaintiff sought review of a 
final decision of the Tax Commission ordering Chris & Dick's to 
pay a ten percent penalty for the untimely filing of a prepayment 
sales tax return. Plaintiff argued that the language of the 
statute imposing the penalty was so vague as to violate the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
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Constitution. Chris & Pick's, 791 P.2d at 513. Specifically, 
Plaintiff argued that the nature of the fine to be imposed under 
the penalty statute was so uncertain that it did not express what 
conduct is prohibited. _Jd. at 516. The Court found that the 
standard to apply is that M[a] statute will be found 
unconstitutionally vague only when it is not sufficiently 
explicit and clear to inform the ordinary reader of common 
intelligence what conduct is proscribed." Jd. at 511. The Court 
concluded that the statute was explicit and clear enough to 
prohibit conduct and thus rejected Plaintiff's due process claim. 
Id. at 516. The statutes in the case at hand clearly provide 
that retail sales of tangible personal property are subject to 
sales tax, and leases and rentals of tangible personal property 
are subject to use tax (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a), (k) 
(19 87)). Thesy are clear enough that they do not violate 
Petitioner's due process rights in that the ordinary reader of 
common intelligence is informed of what is prescribed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner is subject to sales tax on the sale of water 
softeners sold after installation and use of the water softener 
pursuant to a lease agreement. The sale of a water softener 
after such a lease arrangement is the sale of tangible personal 
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property which is attached to real property and is subject to 
sales tax pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987) and 
Utah Admin. Rule 865-19-51S (1986). The sale price is not exempt 
from tax as installation charges because Petitioner has not 
proved that the sale price represents solely such installation 
charges, and because Petitioner failed to separately state such 
charges pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule 865-19-51S(E) (1986). 
Respondent has not violated the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act (hereinafter "UARA") because Respondent relied on 
established statutes and rules in assessing Petitioner's sale of 
water softeners. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3 (1986), 
rulemaking is not required when a procedure or standard is 
already described in statute. Since the sales tax standard is 
already described by statute, Petitioner is on notice of the tax 
requirements, and no rule is required. Furthermore, Respondent 
has not "changed*1 its policy on the taxing of water softeners, 
but has merely applied the relevant taxing statutes to the 
situation at hand. 
Petitioner should not be relieved of its tax liability for 
misinterpretation of the law. Mistake of law is no defense for 
failure to pay taxes even if made in good faith. 
Petitioner's due process claim is not properly before this 
Court since Petitioner failed to raise such a claim before the 
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Tax Commission. Alternatively, Respondent has not violated 
Petitioner's due process rights because the taxing statutes are 
sufficiently clear as to what conduct is required. Additionally, 
Petitioner is not entitled to attorney fees in this case because 
Petitioner failed to raise a section 1983 claim before the Tax 
Commission. Petitioner is now barred from raising a section 1983 
claim and is therefore not entitled to attorney fees under 
section 1988. 
Wherefore, Respondent requests this Court to affirm the 
decision of the Tax Commission and hold Petitioner liable for the 
sales tax due on the sale of water softeners sold after 
installation and use of the water softeners pursuant to a lease 
agreement. 
DATED this M_ day of 
V 
_, 1992 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
by and through 
Susan L. Barnum 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-103 
59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate. 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state; 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or telephone or telegraph corpora-
tions as defined by § 54-2-1, whether the corporations are municipally or 
privately owned, for all transportation, telephone service, or telegraph 
service; 
(c^ gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for commercial cunsumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, 
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar ac-
commodations; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or 
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other 
tangible personal property; 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, rnotel, or trailer court accommodations and ser-
vices for less than 30 consecutive days; 
<j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs 
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property 
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection il)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(1) shall be: 
(a^ 5-3/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be: 
(a) 2-3/327c through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 29c from and after January 1, 1990. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 4; 1933 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1937, ch. I l l , § 1; C. 1943, 
80-15-4; L. 1943, ch. 93, § 1; 1959, ch. 113, 
§ 1; 1961, ch. 148, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 
1965, ch. 126, § 1; 1965, ch. 127, § 1; 1969, 
ch. 187, § 2; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 2; 1973, 
ch. 153, § 1; 1975, ch. 179, § 1; 1977, ch. 220, 
§ 1; 1983, ch. 258, § 4; 1983, ch. 270, § 1; 
1983 (1st S.S.), ch. 6, § 1; 1984, ch. 56, § 1; 
1985, ch. 172, § 2; 1986, ch. 37, § 2; 1986 (2nd 
S.S.), ch. 4, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-4; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 23; 1987, ch. 148, 
§ 6; 1987, ch. 221, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment by Chapter 258, inserted provisions for a 
Vg^ increase in sales tax from July 1, 1983, 
through June 30, 1987; and added" the final 
paragraph. 
The 1983 amendment by Chapter 270 in-
serted the exemption on the sale of currency 
and coinage and on gold, silver, and platinum 
ingots, bars, medallions and coins in Subsec-
tion (ah 
The 1983 (1st S.S.) amendment added i-2^ to 
the sales tax rates herein for the period begin-
ning October 1, 1983, and ending September 
30, 1984. 
The 1984 amendment added *'29c to the sales 
tax rates herein beginning October 1. 1984. 
The 1985 amendment substituted "June 30. 
1986, <ii) 4*V64<2 from July 1, 1986. through 
December 31, 1989, and (iv) 41
 27c from Janu-
ary 1, 1990" for "June 30, 1987 and (in 4><2^  
from July 1, 1987" in Subsection (a>; substi-
tuted "June 30, 1986, 43b/64<2 from July 1, 1986, 
through December 31, 1989, and 4V2<* from 
January 1, 1990M for "June 30, 1987 and 4>/2<£ 
from July 1, 1987" in Subsections (bull. (bu2» 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
59-15-4. Sales tax — Rate — Disposition of revenue from 
temporary increase. 
(1) There is levied and there shall be collected and paid 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible personal property made 
within the state of Utah equivalent to the following rates (1) 45/»9< from 
October 1, 1983, through June 30 1986 <n) 4™/*^ from July 1 1986 
through December 31, 1989, and (m) 4'/»% from January 1, 1990 and 
thereafter of the purchase price paid or charged except that where a 
person takes, as a trade in for part pa>ment of the merchandise sold, 
tangible personal propert} other than mone>, that tax shall be com 
puted and paid only upon the net difference between the selling price of 
the merchandise sold and the amount of the trade-in allowance For 
the purpose of this subsection, currency and coinage constituting legal 
tender of the United States or of a foreign nation, all sales of gold, 
silver, or platinum ingots, bars, medallions, or decorative coins, not 
const i tu t ing legal tender of any nation, with a gold, silver, or plati-
num content of not less than SQc/c shall not be considered tangible 
personal property The sale of coal, fuel oil, and other fuels shall not be 
subject to the tax except as hereinafter provided 
(b) A tax equivalent to the following percentages of the amount paid 
d) Wn9c from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986, 43«/64% 
from July 1, 1986, through December 31, 1989, and 41/2<2 from 
January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to common 
carriers or telephone or telegraph corporations as defined by 
§ 54-2-1, whether the corporations are municipally or privately 
owned, for all transportation, telephone service, or telegraph ser-
vice, but the tax shall not apply to intrastate movements of freight 
and express or to street railway fares or to the sale of newspapers 
and newspaper subscriptions 
(n) VUCA from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986, 4J«/W% 
from July 1, 1986, through December 31, 1989, and 41/27< from 
January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to any person 
as defined in this act including municipal corporations for gas, 
electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels ^old or furnished for 
commercial consumption For purposes of this Subsection (b), com-
mercial consumption shall not include the amounts of these fuels 
sold or furnished to apartment houses or other similar buildings 
where persons maintain their places of residence but only to the 
extent these fuels are used for these places of residence 
(in) l5/8^ from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986, 1*1*% 
from July 1, 1986, through December 31, 1989, and 1V2<£ from 
January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the amount paid to any person 
as defined in this act, including municipal corporations, for gas, 
electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished for 
domestic or residential use, including use by persons residing in 
apartment houses or similar buildings 
(c) A tax equivalent to the following rates 45/8<7r from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, 43«/M7C from July 1, 1986, through De-
cember 31, 1989, and 41/j% from January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the 
amount paid for all meals furnished by any restaurant, eating house, 
hotel, drugstore, club, or other place 
(d) A tax equivalent to the following rates 4^«# from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, A^l^9( from July 1, 1986, through De-
cember 31, 1989, and \vtfk from January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the 
amount paid for admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, 
or recreation 
SALES TAX 59-15-4 
(e) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45/h% from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, 4te/Mtf from July 1, 1986, through De-
cember 31, 1989, and AlU9c from January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the 
amount paid or charged for all services for repairs, renovations, 
cleaning, or washing of tangible personal property or for installation of 
tangible personal property rendered in connection with other tangible 
personal property. 
(f) A tax equivalent to the following rates: 45/V# from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, A^UM from July 1, 1986, through De-
cember 31, 1989, and 4l///c from January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the 
amount paid or charged for tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court 
accommodations and services. This subsection shall not apply to the 
amount paid or charged for tourist home, motel, hotel, or trailer court 
where residency is maintained continuously under the terms of a lease 
or similar agreement for a period of not less than 30 days 
(g) A tax equivalent to the following rates. 4bUcA from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, 4-">/Mtf from July 1, 1986, through De-
cember 31, 1989, and 4l/77< from January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the 
amount paid or charged for laundry and dry cleaning services. 
(h) A tax equivalent to the following rates 4^8% from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, 4*I<AC/< from July 1, 1986, through De-
cember 31, 1989, and A^ifk from January 1, 1990, and thereafter of the 
amount paid or charged for leases and rentals of tangible personal 
property, when situs of the property is in this state, or if the lessee took 
possession in this state; provided, however, the tax need not be paid if 
the leased property is used exclusively in a foreign state 
(2) The revenue collected from a XU% increase in sales tax from July 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986 and a bi$\ck increase in sales tax from July 1, 
1986 through December 31, 1989, shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(Supp. 1986) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
59-16-3. Use tax — Rate — Disposition of revenue from 
temporary increase. 
(1) There is levied and imposed an excise tax on: 
(a) The storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible 
personal property purchased at the rate of: (i> 4r7nVr from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, and iii) 4-»/M'* from July 1, 1986, through 
December 31. 1989, and (iii> 4V//< from January 1, 1990, and thereafter 
of the sales price of such property. 
(b) The services for repairs or renovation of tangible personal prop-
erty or for installation of tangible personal property rendered in con-
nection with other tangible personal property at the rate of: (i) 45V# 
from October 1, 1983, through June 30, 1986, and (ii) 4J8/64# from July 
1, 1986, through December 31, 1989, and (iii) 41/2<7r from January 1, 
1990, and thereafter of the amount charged and paid for such services; 
if the retailer was called to this state, or if the property was sent to a 
retailer in another state, expressly for the purpose of performing such 
services. 
(c) The lease or rental of tangible personal property stored, used, or 
otherwise consumed in this state at the rate of: (i) 45/H^ from October 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986, and (ii) WM from July 1,1986, through 
December 31, 1989, and (iii) 4 W from January 1, 1990, and thereafter 
of the amount charged or paid for such rentals. 
(2) Every person storing, using, or otherwise consuming in this state 
tangible personal property purchased, serviced, leased, or rented, shall be 
liable for the tax imposed by this act, and the liability shall not be extin-
guished until the tax has been paid to this state. 
(3) The revenue collected from a VH9C increase in use tax from July 1, 
1983, through June 30, 1986 and a 6/w^ increase in use tax from July 1, 
1986 through December 31, 1989, shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
TAX COMMISSION RULES 
$51. Fabrication and Installation labor In connection with retail sales 
of tangible personal property (Applies to sales $nd use taxes}. 
a. Sales tax applies to the sales of fabricated articles of tangible 
personal property. The amounts charged for fabrication and instal-
lation which Is part of the process of creating the finished article must 
be included in the amount upon which tax is collected by sheet metal 
shops, Iron works, boilerworks* cabinet works, mill working plantsand 
other simitar business. This type of labor and service charge may not 
be deducted from the selling price used for taxation purposes even 
though billed separately to the consumer and regardless of whether or 
not the articles are commonly carried in stock or made up on special 
Order. 
b. Casting, forging, forming, cutting, drilling, heat treating, 
surfacing, machining, constructing and assembling are examples of 
operations which are steps in the processing or series of operations 
resulting in the creation or production of a finished article. 
c. Charges for labor to Install personal property in connection 
with other personal property are taxable (see regulation S78) whether 
material is furnished by seller or not. Labor to install tangible personal 
property to real property is exempt, whether the personal property 
becomes part of the realty or not. See regulation S58, dealing with 
repairs and improvements of real property, to determine applicable tax 
on personal property which becomes a part of real property. Tangible 
personal property which is attached to real property, but remains 
personal property, Is subject to sales tax on the retail selling price of 
the personal property. The installation charges in such case are 
exempt if stated as a separate charge. If the retailer makes no 
segregation of selling price and installation charges, the sales tax* 
applies to the entire contract price including installation charges. 
d. This regulation Is primarily to cover manufacturing and 
assembling labor. Other regulations deal with other types of labor and 
should be referred to whenever necessary. 
Footnote: As *nenti*4 sM. Septembsr 5, 1982 to revlst third paragraph. 
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S58. Materials and supplies sold to owners, contractors and 
repairmen of real property (Applies to sales and use taxes). 
a. Tangible persona! property sold to real property contractors 
and repairmen of real property is generally subject to tax. The person 
who converts the personal property into real property is considered to 
be the consumer of the personal property since he is the last one to 
own it as personal property. The contractor or repairman is deemed to 
be the consumer of tangible personal property used to improve, alter 
or repair real property regardless of the type of contract entered into, 
whether it is a lump sum, time end material or acost-plus contract. The 
sate of real property is not subject to the tax nor is labor performed on 
real property subject to the tax. To give an example, the sale of a 
completed home or building is not subject to the tax, but the sale of 
materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable 
transactions as sales to final consumers. This is true whether the 
contract is performed for an individual, a religious Institution or 
governmental instrumentality. Sales of material to religious or 
charitable institutions ana government agencies are exempt only if 
sold as tangible personal property and the seller is not required to 
install the material as an improvement to realty or use it to repair real 
property 
b if the contractor or repairman purchases all materials and 
supplies from vendors wno collect the Utah tax, no sales tax license is 
required unless he also makes direct 88les of tangible personal 
property in addtion to his work on real property. If direct sales are 
made, the contractor is required to obtain a ssles tax license and must 
collect tax on all sates of tangible persona! property to final consumers 
ano must accrue and report tax on all merchandise bought tax-free 
and used in performing contracts to improve or repair real property. 
Books and records must be kept to account for both material sold and 
material consumed. 
c. Sales of materials ana supplies to contractors for use in out-
of-state jobs are taxaoie unless sold in interstate commerce in 
accordance with regulation S44 
d. This regulation does not apply to contracts whereby the 
retailer sells and instaMs personai property which does not become 
part of the rea property. See regulations S51. S59, and S78 for 
information dealing w«th installation arc repaid of tangible personal 
property. 
(1986) 
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878. Services of repair, renovation, and Installation of tangible 
personal property (Applies to sales and use taxes). 
a. Persons engaged in the business of washing, cleaning, 
repairing, or renovating tangible personal property, whether material 
is furnished by seller or not, are required to collect the sales tax upon 
the total charge made for the rendition of such services, together with 
the charge for tangible personal property, if any, sold <n connection 
with such services 
b. Amounts paid or charged for installing tangible personal 
property In connection with other tangible personal property are 
subject to tax. Installation of personal property to realty is not subject 
to tax as explained in regulations S51 and S58. 
c. Charges made for cleaning and blocking hats are taxable 
under the provisions of the act imposing a tax on dry cleaning services. 
d. Charges made for lubrication of motor vehicles are taxable as 
sales of tangible personal property unless the charge Is separately 
itemized by the vendor for material and services. 
e. Charges made for washing and cleaning motor vehicles and 
other tangible personal property made after July 1,1989, are subject to 
the sales tax. Effective May 13,1975, receipts from coin-operated car 
washes are exempt from sales tax. 
f. Motor vehicles, trailers, contractors' equipment, drilling equip-
ment, commercial equipment, railroad cars and engines, radio and 
television sets, watches, jewelry, clothing and accessories, shoes, tires 
and tubes, office equipment, furniture, bicycles, sporting equipment, 
boats and household appliances not permanently attached to a house 
or building are a few examples of tangible personal property upon 
which the sales or use tax applies when repaired, washed, cleaned, 
renovated, or installed In connection with other tangible personal 
property. 
g. Property, t*ade fixtures or equipment which is attached to real 
property or improvements to real property, in a permanent or 
semipermanent manner, shall be cons.dered as real property while so 
attached. Such property, trade fixtures or equipment, if removed from 
the premises for the purpose of repairs, shall be considered as tangible 
personal property to which the tax shall apply, 
h. Amounts oaia or charged fo' services upon the person of an 
individual, such as physicians' or barbers' services, are not taxable. 
Amounts paid or charged for repairing, building or renovating of real 
property, as such, are not taxable, except as explained in regulation 
No S58. 
i. Laundry and dry cleaning services obtained through self-
service, coin-operated laundry and ary cleaning machines are exempt 
from sales tax. 
footnote: As •mended, eft Septembers. 1982. Recent history: 1973, idded exemption 
for coin-operated laundry and dry*cl«ining sties: 1975, added exemption for coin-
operated car wash ssles; 1982. added reference in first pingriph to material furnished 
by seller end generally revised format 
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63-46a-l. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act." 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-l, enacted by L. act," referred to in this section, means Laws 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 1985, ch. 158, §§ 1 and 2 which is codified as 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this §§ 63-46a-l to 63-46a-15. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Reviews. — Recent Develop- C.J.S. — 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative 
ments in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649. Law and Procedure §§ 87 to 102. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Administra- Key Numbers. — Administrative Law and 
tive Law §§ 92 to 137; 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adminis- Procedure «=> 381 to 427. 
trative Law §§ 277 to 314. 
63-46a-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Agency" means each state board, commission, institution, depart-
ment, division, officer, or other state government entity other than the 
Legislature, its committees, the political subdivisions of the state, or the 
courts, which is authorized or required by law to make rules, adjudicate, 
grant or withhold licenses, grant or withhold relief from legal obligations, 
or perform other similar actions or duties delegated by law. 
(2) "Bulletin" means the Utah State Bulletin. 
(3) "Effective" means operative and enforceable. 
(4) (a) "File" means to submit a document to the office as prescribed by 
this chapter. 
(b) "Filing date" means the day and time the document is recorded 
as received by the office. 
(5) "Office" means the Office of Administrative Rules, which is under 
the supervision of the Department of Administrative Services. 
(6) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, governmental subdivision, or public or private organization of any 
character other than an agency. 
(7) "Publication" means making a rule available to the public by print-
ing the rule or a summary of the rule in the bulletin. "Publication date" 
means the inscribed date of the bulletin. 
(8) (a) "Rule" means a statement made by an agency that applies to a 
general class of persons, rather than specific persons and: (i) imple-
ments or interprets policy made by statute; or (ii) prescribes the pol-
icy of the agency in the absence of express statutory policy; or (iii) 
prescribes the administration of the agency's functions or describes 
its organization, procedures, and operations. "Rule" includes the 
amendment or repeal of an existing rule. 
(b) "Rule" does not include: (i) statements concerning only the in-
ternal management of an agency and which do not affect private 
persons as a class, other agencies, or other governmental entities; (ii) 
declaratory rulings pursuant to § 63-46a-14; or (iii) executive orders. 
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History: C. 1953, 63-46a-2, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-3. When rulemaking is required. 
(1) Each agency shall maintain a complete copy of its current rules and 
make it available to the public for inspection during its regular business 
hours. 
(2) Each agency shall make rules to fulfill the purposes of this chapter. 
(3) Rulemaking is required when: 
(a) agency actions affect a class of persons; 
(b) agency actions affect the operations of another agency; or 
(c) statutory or federal mandate requires rules. 
(4) Rulemaking is not required when: 
(a) a procedure or standard is already described in statute; 
(b) agency action affects an individual person, not a class of persons; 
(c) agency action applies only to internal agency procedures; or 
(d) grammatical or other insignificant rule changes do not affect 
agency policy or the application or results of agency actions. 
(5) Each agency may incorporate by reference applicable federal and profes-
sionally recognized uniform code rules, if the agency: 
(a) incorporates by reference federal and uniform rules, and all future 
changes in them, under the procedures of this chapter; 
(b) states specifically in its rules which federal and uniform rules are 
incorporated by reference, and any agency deviation from them; and 
(c) maintains complete and current copies of federal and uniform rules 
incorporated by reference, both at the agency and at the Office of Admin-
istrative Rules, available for public inspection. 
(6) The state attorney general shall provide agencies any assistance to en-
sure agency rules are legally sound. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-3, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-4. Rulemaking procedure. 
(1) When making, amending, or repealing a rule, agencies shall comply 
with this section, consistent procedures required by other statutes, applicable 
federal mandates, and rules made by the office to implement this chapter, 
except as provided in §§ 63-46a-6 and 63-46a-7. 
(2) Each agency shall file its proposed rule and rule analysis form with the 
office. Rule amendments shall be marked, with newr language underlined and 
deleted language interlined. The form and proposed rule, unless the rule is too 
long as determined by the office, shall be published in the next issue of the 
bulletin. 
(3) The rule analysis form shall contain: 
(a) a summary of the rule or change; 
(b) the purpose of the rule or reason for the change; 
(c) the statutory authority or federal requirement for the rule; 
(d) the anticipated cost or savings to the state budget and compliance 
cost for affected persons; 
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(e) how interested persons may inspect the full text of the rule; 
(f) how interested persons may present their views on the rule; 
(g) the time and place of any scheduled public hearing; 
(h) the name and telephone number of an agency employee who may be 
contacted about the rule; and 
(i) the signature of the agency head or designee. 
(4) A copy of the rule analysis form shall be mailed to all persons who have 
made timely request of the agency for advance notice of its rulemaking pro-
ceedings, and to any other person who, by statutory or federal mandate, or in 
the judgment of the agency, should also receive notice. 
(5) Following the publication date, the agency shall allow at least 30 days 
for public comment on the rule. During the public comment period the agency 
may hold a hearing on the rule. 
(6) Except as provided in §§ 63-46a-6 and 63-46a-7, a proposed rule be-
comes effective on any date specified by the agency which is no fewer than 30 
nor more than 90 days after the publication date. The agency shall provide 
written notification of the rule's effective date to the office. Notice of the 
effective date shall be published in the next issue of the bulletin. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-4, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur 2d Administra- Key Numbers. — Administrative Law and 
tive Law §§ 279 to 285. Procedure «=> 392 to 402 
C.J.S. — 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative 
Law and Procedure §§ 103, 108. 
63-46a-5. Public hearings. 
(1) Each agency shall hold a public hearing on a proposed rule if: 
(a) required by state or federal mandate; 
(b) (i) another state agency, ten interested persons, or an interested 
association having not fewer than ten members request a hearing; and 
(ii) the agency receives the request in writing not more than 15 
days after the publication date of the proposed rule. 
(2) The requested hearing shall be held within 30 days of receipt of the 
request. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-6. Changes in rules. 
(1) If an agency changes a proposed rule already published in the bulletin, 
the procedures of this section apply to the change unless: 
(a) the change is grammatical or does not affect agency policy or the 
application or results of agency actions, in which case the agency need 
only notify the office of the change; or 
(b) the rule is already effective, in which case the agency shall amend 
the rule under § 63-46a-4. 
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(2) To change a proposed rule, the agency shall file a copy of the changed 
rule and a rule analysis form reflecting the change with the office, which shall 
publish the form in the bulletin. 
(3) The changed proposed rule becomes effective 30 days after its publica-
tion date. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-6, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-7. Exceptions to rulemaking procedure. 
(1) All agencies shall comply with the rulemaking procedures of § 63-46a-4 
unless an agency finds that these procedures would: 
(a) cause an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare; 
(b) cause an imminent budget reduction because of budget restraints or 
federal requirements; or 
(c) place the agency in violation of federal or state law. 
(2) When finding its rule excepted under this section from regular rulemak-
ing procedures, the agency shall file a copy of the rule and a rule analysis 
form, including the specific reasons and justifications for its findings, with the 
office. The rule shall be published in the bulletin as provided in Subsection 
63-46a-4(2). The agency shall also notify interested parties as provided in 
Subsection 63-46a-4(4). The rule becomes effective for a period not exceeding 
120 days on the date of filing or any later designated date. 
(3) If the agency intends the rule to be effective beyond 120 days, the 
agency shall also comply with the procedures of § 63-46a-4. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a«7, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-8. Synopsis of rulemaking to interim committee, 
(1) Each agency shall yearly provide to the members of the appropriate 
legislative interim committee, as determined by the Legislative Management 
Committee, a brief synopsis of all rulemaking activity by the agency during 
the past year; action taken to comply with federal law shall be so designated. 
(2) The synopsis shall be sent to the committee members so that it arrives 
at least one week prior to the committee's October meeting date. 
(3) The report shall encompass all of the agency's rulemaking activity as 
described in Subsection (1) from September 15 of the previous year to Septem-
ber 15 of the year the synopsis is distributed under Subsection (2). 
History: C. 1953, 63«46a-8, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
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63-46a-9. Agency review of rules-
Each agency shall review all rules within five years of the rule's effective 
date and then at five-year intervals, except that rules effective prior to 1983 
need not be reviewed until 1988. At the conclusion of the review, the agency 
shall continue, amend, or repeal the rule. If the agency amends or repeals the 
rule, it shall comply with the rulemaking procedures of this chapter. If the 
agency continues the rule, it shall file with the office a notice of continuation 
and a statement citing a supporting reason for continuation, which shall be 
published in the bulletin. The supporting reason shall include: 
(1) a concise statement of the particular statutory provisions under 
which the rule is enacted and how these provisions authorize or require 
the rule; 
(2) a summary of wrritten comments received after enactment of the 
rule from interested persons supporting or opposing the rule; and 
(3) a reasoned justification for continuation of the rule, including rea-
sons why the agency disagrees with comments in opposition to the rule, if 
any. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-9, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-10. Office of Administrative Rules-
The Office of Administrative Rules shall: 
(1) establish all filing, publication, and hearing procedures necessary 
to make rules under this chapter; 
(2) record in a log the receipt of all agency rules, rule analysis forms, 
and notices of effective dates; 
(3) make the log, copies of all proposed rules and rulemaking docu-
ments available for public inspection; 
(4) publish at least monthly all proposed rules, rule analysis forms, 
notices of effective dates, and continuation notices in the bulletin, except 
that the complete text of any proposed rule excessive in length or which is 
expensive to publish, as determined by the office, may be included by 
reference; 
(5) compile, codify, and index all effective rules in an administrative 
code which shall be the reference source of all state administrative rules, 
and periodically publish this code and supplements or revisions; 
(6) publish at least monthly a digest summarizing all rules and notices 
printed in the most recent bulletin; 
(7) print, or contract to print, all rulemaking publications the office 
determines necessary to implement this chapter; 
(8) distribute without charge copies of the bulletin and administrative 
code to state-designated repositories and the two houses of the Legisla-
ture, and distribute without charge copies of the digest to state legisla-
tors, agencies, and political subdivisions on request; 
(9) distribute, at prices covering all costs, all rulemaking publications 
to requesting persons and agencies, except as provided in Subsection (8); 
(10) provide agencies assistance in rulemaking; and 
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(11) administer this chapter and require state agencies to comply with 
filing, publication, and hearing procedures. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-10, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-ll. Legislative Review Committee. 
(1) There is created a Legislative Review Committee of six members, no 
more than four of whom may be of the same political party, which shall be 
designated the Rules Review Committee. The committee shall be composed of 
three members of the Senate to be appointed by the president of the Senate 
and three members of the House to be appointed by the speaker of the House. 
No more than two senators and two representatives may be of the same politi-
cal party. Members shall serve for two-year terms, and until their successors 
are appointed. Vacancies on the committee shall be filled by the appointing 
authority for the remainder of the term. A vacancy exists whenever a commit-
tee member ceases to be a member of the Legislature. 
(2) Each agency rule as defined in Subsection 63-46a-2(8) shall be submit-
ted to the committee at the same time public notice is given under Subsection 
63-46a-4(2). 
(3) The committee shall exercise continuous oversight of the process of rule-
making and examine rules as submitted by each agency with respect to (i) 
statutory authority; (ii) compliance with legislative intent; (iii) impact on the 
economy and on the government operations of the state and local political 
subdivisions; and (iv) impact on affected persons. To carry out these duties, it 
may examine other issues it deems appropriate. The committee shall follow 
generally accepted principles of statutory construction. 
(4) The committee may request a fiscal note regarding any rule, from the 
legislative fiscal analyst. 
(5) The committee may prepare written findings of its review of each rule 
following the committee review of the rule and include any recommendations, 
including legislative action. The committee shall send a copy of any findings 
to the state agency concerned, with a request that the agency notify the 
committee of any changes in the rule reviewed pursuant to the recommenda-
tions, and if a copy of the findings wras requested by a member of the Legisla-
ture or by a person affected by the rule, to the person requesting the copy. The 
committee shall also send a copy of the findings to the presiding officers of 
both the House and the Senate, who shall refer the determinations to any 
legislative committee concerned. 
(6) The committee shall submit a report on the review of state agency rules 
by the committee to each member of the Legislature at each regular session. 
The report shall include: 
(a) the findings and recommendations made by the committee under 
Subsection (5); 
(b) any action taken by an agency in response to committee recommen-
dations; and 
(c) any recommendations by the committee for legislation. 
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History: C. 1953, 63-46a-ll, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-12. Interested parties. 
An interested person may petition an agency requesting the making, 
amendment, or repeal of a rule. The office shall prescribe by rule the form for 
petitions and the procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposi-
tion. A statement shall accompany the proposed rule, or amendment or repeal 
of a rule, demonstrating that the proposed action is within the jurisdiction of 
the agency and appropriate to the powers of the agency. Within 30 days after 
submission of a petition, the agency shall either deny the petition in writing 
stating its reasons for the denial or initiate rulemaking proceedings in accor-
dance with § 63-46a-4. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-12, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
63-46a-13. Declaratory judgment to determine validity of 
rule. 
(1) The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for 
declaratory judgment in any district court of this state with appropriate 
venue, if it is alleged that the rule, or its potential application, interferes with 
or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privi-
leges of the plaintiff. 
(2) In an action for declaratory judgment on a rule, the agency shall be 
made a party to the action. 
(3) A declaratory judgment by a court may be rendered whether or not the 
plaintiff has requested the agency to pass upon the applicability of the rule in 
question. However, the issue of applicability may not be determined by the 
district court while the issue is under consideration by the agency during any 
proceeding pending before that agency or during the time the agency's deci-
sion concerning applicability is subject to appeal or being considered on ap-
peal. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-13, enacted by L. service, rights of individuals on whom data 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. stored, data in dispute, procedure, § 63-2-85.4. 
Cross-References. — Archives and records 
63-46a-14. Contesting a rule. 
A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of noncompliance with the 
procedural requirements of this chapter shall commence within two years of 
the effective date of the rule. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-14, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § L 
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63-46a-15. Declaratory ruling by agency. 
Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition by 
the agency of petitions for declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any 
statutory provision, rule, or order of the agency. Agency rulings disposing of 
petitions have the same status as agency decisions in cases disposed of by the 
agency after hearing. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-15, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 158, § 1. 
(1987) 
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(iv) the governor's executive orders or proclamations; 
(v) opinions issued by the attorney general's office; 
(vi) declaratory rulings issued by the agency according to the 
provisions of Section 63-46b-21 except as required by Section 
63-46a-3; or 
(vii) rulings by an agency in adjudicative proceedings, except 
as required by Subsection 63-46a-3(6). 
(14) "Rule Analysis Form" means the form created by the division to 
summarize and analyze rules. 
(15) "Substantive change" means a change in a rule tha t affects the 
application or results of agency actions. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-2, enacted by L. The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1985, ch. 158, § 1; 1987, ch. 241, § 1; 1988, 1988, substituted "Section 63-46b-21" for "See-
ch. 72, § 13. tion 63-46a-15" in Subsection (13)(c)(vi) and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- made two minor stylistic changes, 
ment so rewrote the section as to make a de-
tailed analysis impracticable. 
63-46a-3- When rulemaking is required. 
(1) Each agency shall: 
(a) maintain a complete copy of its current rules; and 
(b) make it available to the public for inspection during its regular 
business hours. 
(2) In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each agency shall 
make rules when agency action: 
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action; 
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit; 
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency; and 
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute. 
(3) Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a writ ten interpre-
tation of a state or federal legal mandate. 
(4) Rulemaking is not required when: 
(a) agency action applies only to internal agency management, inmates 
or residents of a state correctional, diagnostic, or detention facility, per-
sons under state legal custody, patients admitted to a state hospital, 
members of the state retirement system, or students enrolled in a state 
education institution; 
(b) a standardized agency manual applies only to internal fiscal or 
administrative details of governmental entities supervised under statute; 
(c) an agency issues policy or other statements tha t are advisory, infor-
mative, or descriptive, and do not conform to the requirements of Subsec-
tions (2) and (3); or 
(d) an agency makes nonsubstantive changes in a rule, except that the 
agency shall file all nonsubstantive changes in a rule with the division. 
(5) A rule shall enumerate any penalty authorized by s ta tute that may 
result from its violation. 
(6) Each agency shall enact rules incorporating the principles of law not 
already in its rules tha t are established by final adjudicative decisions within 
120 days after the decision is announced in its cases. 
(7) (a) Each agency may enact a rule that incorporates by reference: 
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(i) all or any part of another code, rule, or regulation that has been 
adopted by a federal agency, an agency or political subdivision of this 
state, an agency of another state, or by a nationally-recognized orga-
nization or association; 
(ii) lists, tables, illustrations, or similar materials that are subject 
to frequent change, fully described in the rule, and are available for 
public inspection; or 
(hi) lists, tables, illustrations, or similar materials that the direc-
tor determines are too expensive to reproduce in the administrative 
code. 
(b) Rules incorporating materials by reference shall: 
(i) be enacted according to the procedures outlined in this chapter; 
(ii) state tha t the referenced material is incorporated by reference; 
and 
(iii) define specifically what material is incorporated by reference 
and identify any agency deviations from it. 
(c) The agency shall identify any substantive changes in the material 
incorporated by reference by following the rulemaking procedures of this 
chapter. 
(d) The agency shall maintain a complete and current copy of the refer-
enced material available for public inspection at the agency and at the 
division. 
(8) (a) This chapter is not intended to inhibit the exercise of agency discre-
tion within the limits prescribed by statute or agency rule. 
(b) An agency may enact a rule creating a justified exception to a rule. 
(9) An agency may obtain assistance from the attorney general to ensure 
tha t its rules meet legal and constitutional requirements. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-3, enacted by L. The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1985, ch. 158, § 1; 1987, ch. 241, § 2; 1988, 1988, in Subsection (6) inserted "not already in 
ch. 72, § 14. its rules that are," substituted "120" for "90," 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- and added "in its cases." 
ment so rewrote the section as to make a de-
tailed analysis impracticable. 
63-46a-4. Rulemaking procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 63-46a-6 and 63-46a-7, when making, 
amending, or repealing a rule, agencies shall comply: 
(a) with the requirements of this section; 
(b) with consistent procedures required by other statutes; 
(c) with applicable federal mandates; and 
(d) with rules made by the division to implement this chapter. 
(2) (a) Each agency shall file its proposed rule and rule analysis form with 
the division. 
(b) Rule amendments shall be marked, with new language underlined 
and deleted language interlined. 
(c) (i) The division shall publish the rule analysis form and the text of 
the proposed rule in the next issue of the bulletin, unless the director 
determines that the text of the rule is too long. 
(ii) If the director determines that the rule is too long to publish, 
the director shall publish the rule analysis form and shall publish the 
rule by reference to a copy on file with the division. 
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(3) The rule analysis form shall contain: 
(a) a summary of the rule or change; 
(b) the purpose of the rule or reason for the change; 
(c) the statutory authority or federal requirement for the rule; 
(d) the anticipated cost or savings to: 
'(i) the state budget; 
(ii) local governments; and 
(m) individuals; 
(e) the compliance cost for affected persons; 
(fi how interested persons may inspect the full text of the rule; 
(g) how interested persons may present their views on the rule; 
(h) the time and place of any scheduled public hearing; 
(i) the name and telephone number of an agency employee who may be 
contacted about the rule; and 
(j) the name of the agency head or designee who authorized the rule. 
(4) A copy of the rule analysis form shall be mailed to all persons who have 
made timely request of the agency for advance notice of its rulemaking pro-
ceedings, and to any other person who, by statutory or federal mandate, or in 
the judgment of the agency, should also receive notice. 
(5) Following the publication date, the agency shall allow a t least 30 days 
for public comment on the rule. 
(6) (a) Except as provided in Sections 63-46a-6 and 63-46a-7, a proposed 
rule becomes effective on any date specified by the agency tha t is no fewer 
than 30 nor more than 90 days after the publication date. 
(b) The agency shall provide written notice of the rule's effective date 
to the division. 
(c) The division shall publish notice of the effective date of the rule in 
the next issue of the bulletin. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46a-4, enacted by L. ment so rewrote the section as to make a de-
1985, ch . 158, § 1; 1987, ch. 241, § 3. tailed analysis impracticable. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
not valid unless the agency complies with the 
rulemaking procedures prescribed in this chap-
ter Lane v Board of Review, 727 P 2d 206 
(Utah 1986) 
Cited in Williams v Public Serv Comm'n, 
754 P 2d 41 (Utah 1988) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am Ju r 2d Administra- Key Numbers . — Administrative Law and 
tive Law ^ 279 to 285 Procedure c=» 392 to 402 
C.J .S. — 73 C J S Public Administrative 
Law and Procedure H 103, 108. 
ANALYSIS 
Agency rules 
—-Validity 
Cited 
Agency ru les . 
—Validity. 
The rules of an administrative agency are 
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ARTICLE I 
Sec- 7. [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const . 1896. 
Cross-References . — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4 (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection 3 the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid ] 
pointment} 5 [Power to enforce amendment 3 
3 [Disqualification to hold office ] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
42 USCS § 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS 
Veralex1*: Cases and annotations referred to herein can be further 
researched through the Veralex™ electronic retrieval system's two ser-
vices, Auto-Cite® and SHOWME™. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for 
form, parallel references, prior and later history, and annotation refer-
ences. Use SHOWME to display the full text of cases and annotations. 
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of 
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
(R. S. § 1979; Dec. 29, 1979, P. L. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Explanatory notes: 
This section was based upon Act Apr. 20, 1871, ch 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. 
This section formerly appeared as 8 U.S.C. § 43. 
Amendments: 
1979. Act Dec. 29, 1979 inserted "or the District of Columbia" and 
"For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia.". 
Other provisions: 
Application of 1979 amendments. Act Dec. 29, 1979, P. L. 96-170, § 3, 
93 Stat. 1284, which appears as 28 USCS § 1343 note, provided that 
the amendments made to this section by such Act are applicable with 
respect to any deprivation of rights, provileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws occurring after enactment on Dec. 29, 
1979. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Privileges and immunities, USCS, Constitution, Art. 4, § 2 and Amend. 14, 
§ i -
Citizenship, USCS Constitution, Amend. 14, § 1, 
Offenses against civil rights of citizens, 18 USCS §§ 241-246. 
Jurisdiction of district courts, 28 USCS § 1343. 
This section is referred to in 42 USCS §§ 1988, 1997E. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure L Ed: 
Civil Rights, Fed Proc, L Ed, §§ 11:6, 8, 11, 16, 18, 21, 26, 45, 50, 59, 
60, 63, 75, 84, 85, 88, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 
8 
42 USCS § 1988 
§ 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights; attorney's fees 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district 
courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and 
of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States 
in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and 
enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such 
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they 
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to 
furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, 
as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State 
wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is 
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the 
trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the 
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. In any action or 
proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 
1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 USCS §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986], title IX 
of Public Law 92-318 [20 USCS §§ 1681 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 [42 USCS §§ 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs. 
(R. S. § 722; Oct. 19, 1976, P. L. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641; Oct. 21, 1980, 
P. L. 96-481, Title II, § 205(c), 94 Stat. 2330.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"This Title, and of Title 'CIVIL RIGHTS,' and of Title 'CRIMES,'" 
referred to in this section, comprised R. S. §§ 530-1093, 1977-1991, 
and 5323-5550, all of which have been repealed except those appearing 
as 42 USCS §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1992, 1994 30 USCS, and note prec. 
28 USCS § 1781, §53, and 44 USCS §§325, 326. Former repealed 
sections which pertained to the judiciary and crimes are generally 
covered by Titles 18 and 28. 
Explanatory notes: 
This section was based upon Act Apr. 9, 1866, ch 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27; 
May 31, 1870, ch 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144. This section was formerly 
classified to section 729 of Title 28 prior to the general revision and 
enactment of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, by act June 
25, 1948, ch 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869. 
The words "district courts" have been substituted for "district and 
circuit courts" in this section on the authority of Act Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 
231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167, which provided that references in statutes of 
the United States to the circuit courts of the United States shall be 
deemed to be references to the district courts. 
Amendments: 
1976, Act Oct 19, 1976, added "In any action or proceeding to enforce 
a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised 
Statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or 
proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to 
enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.". 
1980. Act Oct. 21, 1980 (effective 10/1/81, as provided by §208 of 
such Act), deleted "or in any civil action or proceeding by or on behalf 
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